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

RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION THE KEY TO SUCCESS?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES B. BRANDON

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION THE KEY TO SUCCESS?		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC JAMES B. BRANDON		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS USAWC CLASS OF 1990 CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS US ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 2 APRIL 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 33
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) mobilization; mobilization readiness; formops; reserve components.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) (OVER)		

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With the pending drawdown of United States military forces, the reliance placed on the Reserve Components of the Army has never been greater. The ability to rapidly mobilize to meet any future contingency will be paramount to the success or failure of the Army to project itself, and in doing so fulfill its role in achieving the national security objectives of the United States government. Mobilization is an extremely complex process which will be made more difficult by the fact that future mobilizations may occur very rapidly. We must continue to improve the process of centralized planning and decentralized execution of detailed, accurate, and well rehearsed mobilization plans for the Reserve Components if we in fact are going to insure that it is the KEY TO SUCCESS.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PAPER

**RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION
THE KEY TO SUCCESS?**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by**

Lieutenant Colonel James B. Brandon, FA

**Colonel Richard D Wilhelm, AR
Project Advisor**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
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**U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
2 April 1990**

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James B. Brandon, LTC, FA

TITLE: Reserve Component Mobilization - The Key to Success

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 2 April 1990

PAGES: 30

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

With the pending drawdown of United States military forces, the reliance placed on the Reserve Components of the Army has never been greater. The ability to rapidly mobilize to meet any future contingency will be paramount to the success or failure of the Army to project itself, and in doing so fulfill its role in achieving the national security objectives of the United States government. Mobilization is an extremely complex process which will be made more difficult by the fact that future mobilizations may occur very rapidly. We must continue to improve the process of centralized planning and decentralized execution of detailed, accurate, and well rehearsed mobilization plans for the Reserve Components if we in fact are going to insure that it is the KEY TO SUCCESS.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. Those blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged."¹

This approach taken by Emperor Haille Salassie against Mussolini's forces in 1935, while simplistic in nature, served the same purpose as our modern mobilization orders, the rapid expansion of the Armed Forces to counter a threat to national security. Unfortunately, previous United States mobilizations (World War's I and II), have required long preparation periods to achieve a high level of military readiness. This was possibly one of the reasons U.S. Reserve Components (RC) have not been mobilized in more recent conflicts. In today's environment with rapidly changing world events and improved technology however, the Army (Active and Reserve Component) must be structured, equipped and trained to provide this expansion without lengthy preparation periods.

WHAT IS MOBILIZATION?

Mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. It is the process that brings all or parts of the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel for active military service, mobilization of the USAR and federalizing the ARNG; extending terms of service; and

other actions necessary to convert to a wartime posture.²

PURPOSE

There are a number of issues which will impact upon our ability to mobilize. Are training requirements which support the mobilization of RC units as clearly defined as mission training? Are we forgetting our experiences from the past? A recent study at the U.S. Army War College noted:

Mobilization of the RC has never been adequately planned. Mobilization planning has been generally nonexistent, and in cases when some plans were prepared, they were grossly faulty assumptions. A result has been the conduct of mobilizations having the same errors, problems and inefficiencies as previous mobilizations. It is embarrassing at best and disgusting at worst to realize that the U.S. Army must relearn the lessons from past mobilizations upon each new one. Mobilization planning is not intellectually demanding work. It is time consuming and requires a great deal of coordination, but it can be properly accomplished if the OSD and the Service Secretaries demand it...and only if that demand is enforced.³

The purpose of this research paper is to examine mobilization doctrine and management to determine if we have in fact learned from our past lessons and taken the necessary corrective actions. In view of constrained resources, base closures (which also serve as mobilization stations), and "the Army plans to reduce its active duty force to about 630,000 soldiers, eliminate three active divisions and withdraw one of the two corps now stationed in Germany"⁴ the ability of the Reserve forces to mobilize becomes even more important. This research paper identifies cost effective

and efficient improvements that can be incorporated into the entire mobilization process.

METHODOLOGY

Critical aspects of mobilization have been examined to include command and control, exercises, unit stationing, validation for deployment, and timeliness of actions which control the mobilization process. Interviews were conducted, both in person and telephonically, with mobilization planners from the Office, Secretary of Defense (OSD) down to and including unit level. Ideas and lessons learned as a result of these interviews were analyzed and included in this paper.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, 1989-1990, p. 12-1.

2. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), System Description, Vol. I, p. 3-1.

3. John D. Stuckey, Colonel, and Joseph H. Pistorius, Colonel, Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, p. ix.

4. Tom Donnelly, "The BIG CHOP: 130,000 from active duty", The Army Times, 11 Dec 89, p. 3.

CHAPTER II

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The total-force policy brought the National Guard and the other Reserve components into full partnership with active components for the purpose of deterring war, providing defense, and waging war. Full partnership meant a concerted effort to organize, train, and equip, and employ both Reserve and active military assets in the most effective overall manner. Full partnership meant general equivalency for active and Reserve forces in training methods, performance standards and readiness. For Guardsmen and Reservists, the total-force policy provided unprecedented opportunities for contributing to the national defense, particularly during peacetime.¹

RELUCTANT STRATEGY?

Why has there been reluctance on the part of the government to consider the Reserve Components (RC) as a total partner when considering military force in the implementation of our national security strategy? Prior to 1973, the reserve forces were considered a back-up to the active military. As a result, they received minimal training opportunities, equipment and resources. Consequently, the RC maintained a relatively low state of military preparedness and mobilization readiness. It was generally expected that once mobilized, training over a considerable period of time would be required to acquire the necessary skills to be combat ready. Because of the extended training time anticipated to

improve unit readiness upon mobilization, it was also expected that large numbers of personnel changes would be made through reassignments and unit cross-leveling. These factors and important political decisions, resulted in the RC comprising only 0.5 percent of the total forces committed during the Vietnam conflict.

The decision not to mobilize the RC during the Vietnam conflict, and the lack of popular support for many of the political decisions associated with this war resulted in the implementation of the "Total Army" concept in the early 1970's. It was not uncommon to hear the phrase that rapidly spread through the Army in the late 1970's which described the next war as a "COME AS YOU ARE" war.

Born out of a revolutionary approach of organizing our military forces to meet the nation's defense needs, the late 1970's and early 80's spawned a new set of terms, phrases and acronyms within the military lexicon. Such terms as "TOTAL FORCE", "TOTAL ARMY", "ONE ARMY", "MOBEX", "REMOB", and "CAPSTONE" are a few of the frequently used descriptors that accompanied a new concept of improving the readiness of our military forces. As a new approach to national defense, the Total Force Concept called for the integration of all military forces into the war planning process.

As an extension of this concept, the notion of "ONE ARMY" was unprecedented in that it integrated the Active Component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) forces into a single military force in terms of resourcing, planning, equipping, training and consequently MOBILIZATION READINESS.²

The magnitude and far reaching implications of this approach to national defense are almost unimaginable. Since the introduction of the Total Force Policy, the RC, both Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) have been given higher priorities and assigned missions which are vital to the warfighting capabilities of the Army. As a result, the RC is at its highest state of readiness in history. Today the RC accounts for more than 50% of the Total Army. In fact this higher reliance on the RC prompted COL(Ret.) Harry Summers, in his book On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, to write:

The National Guard and the Army Reserve returned to the importance they enjoyed in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. Because they had again become an essential element in American Security, the melding of the active and reserve forces into a truly combat ready Total Army became a continuing priority task. One of the first steps was the restructuring of the active Army organization for assistance to the Reserve forces, the affiliation of reserve units with active ones, and the roundout of active divisions with reserve brigades. In the revitalization of the Total Army we gained a further bonus effect that was almost as important as the improvement in our war-fighting capabilities. The Vietnam war had reemphasized the critical importance of the relationship between the Army and the American people. Once again the "citizen soldiers" of our Reserve forces acted as a bridge between the active Army and the American people. Although the pre-Vietnam Army was structured with a large portion of combat support and combat service support units in the Reserve forces (a structure which caused major problems when the Reserves were not mobilized for the war), the post-Vietnam Army is a much more interrelated structure that cannot be committed to sustained combat without reserve mobilization.³

With this greater reliance came a commitment to organize, equip, and train the RC to the same levels as the active Army. As a result, individual and unit training methods, performance standards, and readiness have come under close scrutiny. Additionally, the total-force policy has provided the RC unprecedented opportunities for training with their active Army chains-of-command, (Capstone Program) including participation in Overseas Deployment Training (ODT). RC units have become an integral part of such exercises such as REFORGER, DISPLAY DETERMINATION, and TEAM SPIRIT, as well as operating a full time Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (HEMCO) in Europe to name a few. There is little doubt this increased emphasis on organizing, equipping, and training the RC has resulted in a more professional Reserve force ready to assume their role as full partners in the Total Force. As the RC assumes this role, members of the Army Reserve and National Guard must be prepared for mobilization that could result in their employment in combat operations within a relatively short period of time.

An evaluation of the progress that has been achieved as a result of this total-force policy, clearly demonstrates the Army's reliance on the Reserve Components. In fact, to enhance their combat capability and planning effort the Department of the Army established the CAPSTONE program. This program "...aligns Reserve units with their gaining wartime commanders for the purpose of premobilization planning."⁴ This program has had a significant

impact on force structure, training, and readiness because:

CAPSTONE is an organizational approach to managing the force. Under this program Active and Reserve component units are placed into a wartime organization of the Army designed to meet the enemy threat in a European, Southwest Asian, or Pacific contingency. The structure also includes the forces necessary to sustain the CONUS base.⁵

As a result of this program the wartime commander provides their CAPSTONE aligned units with a guidance letter, SOP's, battlebooks, and reception plans. From this guidance the Reserve commander develops his Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL "identifies mission essential tasks.....based on the unit's wartime mission."⁶ The METL is then used to develop and prioritize the units training program. The unit's Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) provides "....the Army standard for completion of collective tasks."⁷

The RC units are then evaluated during Annual Training (AT) by Active Component (AC) officers and NCO's (from their CAPSTONE higher headquarters if possible). Evaluators consider all of these requirements and prepare the unit's AT evaluation (FORSCOM Form 1R). The 1R becomes yet another instrument in the development of a new training plan.

This increased emphasis on readiness within the Reserve and active components, coupled with expanded responsibilities and decreasing dollars, have brought about a Reserve force which provides 51% of the combat strength and 54% of the army's support strength. RC units have made significant progress in mobilization preparedness under the total-force policy and are training at

levels considered impossible a few years ago. Although the Reserve forces have made significant progress, there are many unique aspects of the RC that are distinct from the AC.

The demands on, and contributions of, Guardsmen and Reservists are so extensive and their performance has been so effective, that even though they serve part-time they can no longer be regarded as anything but military professionals in the fullest sense of that term. Recognition of this professionalism has reinforced military elan and has contributed to a high state of combat readiness. And it has fostered greater understanding and respect for Reserve forces on the part of active component personnel.

ENDNOTES

1. Edward J. Philbin and James L. Gould, The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration, in The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Ed by Bennie J. Wilson, III, May 85, p. 47.

2. Richard D. Wilhelm. Colonel, USA. (Unpublished notes, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1989), p 1.

3. Harry G. Summers, Colonel, USA, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, p. 113.

4. U.S. Department of the Army, AR 11-30, P. 4.

5. U.S. Department of the Army, FORSCOM REG. 350-4, P. 1-1.

6. U.S. Army Training Board, p. 41.

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8. Philbin, p. 49.

CHAPTER III

THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS

In order for a Reserve Component unit to assemble its personnel, consolidate equipment, and enter federal service it must be mobilized. Mobilization is "the process whereby a nation makes the transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a war-fighting posture."¹

LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

As authorized by law or congressional resolution and when directed by the President, the Department of Defense may mobilize all or part of the Armed Forces. Mobilization may occur at several levels, generally the magnitude of the emergency governs the level. The four levels of mobilization are:

(1) **SELECTIVE mobilization.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

(2) **PARTIAL mobilization.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the president (not more than 1,000,000) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

(3) **FULL mobilization.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and

the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

(4) TOTAL mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirement of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.²

The 200K Call-Up is often considered a level of mobilization but it is not, due to legal and system constraints. The 200K allows the President to augment all services by 200,000 personnel for up to 90 days (may be extended an additional 90 days) for an operational mission. However, he must inform Congress of the reasons for the call-up. This call-up is restricted to units and individuals of the selected reserve. Members of the RC called to active duty under this provision may be deployed overseas by the Secretary of Defense.

In short "the authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or Congress... the SECDEF directs mobilization of RC units and manpower through the military departments."³ In essence, the 200K call-up or mobilization is tailored to the threat, and is accomplished in a short period of time. Since this is a critical first step in committing our national military forces to support our national security strategy, it must be well planned and the selected Reserve components must be prepared to deploy in a short period of time.

PHASES OF MOBILIZATION

Since mobilization occurs over an extended period of time, it will occur in five phases. These phases transition the unit from peacetime status at home stations (HS), to mobilization at HS, to mobilization stations (MS), and through the time they reach the operational ready status. These phases assure a systematic transition regardless of the number and size of the units to be mobilized. The five phases of mobilization are:

PHASE I - PREPARATORY. This phase concerns RC units at home stations during peacetime. During this phase, units plan and train to accomplish assigned mobilization missions; prepare mobilization plans and files as directed....., attend mobilization coordination conferences, provided required planning data to MSs, and conduct mobilization training , as directed.

PHASE II - ALERT. This phase begins when the unit receives notice of a pending order to active duty and ends when the unit enters active Federal service (effective date (ED) of entry on Federal active duty). The unit takes specific actions to transition from Reserve Component status.

PHASE III - MOBILIZATION AT HOME STATIONS. This phase begins with the unit's entry on active Federal duty and ends when the unit departs for its MS or POE.

PHASE IV - MOVEMENT TO MOBILIZATION STATIONS. This phase begins with the unit's departure from HS and ends when the unit closes at the MS.

PHASE V - OPERATIONAL READINESS IMPROVEMENT. This phase begins when the mobilized unit closes at its MS and ends when the unit is evaluated as operationally ready for deployment.⁴

Although this phased process sounds uncomplicated, it is extremely complex. Obviously, we have made significant progress during Phase I but there is much more to be done. There are many

commands involved in the process, however, the key to the mastery of mobilization planning are the Continental United States Armies (CONUSA), State Area Commands (STARC) for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) for the Army Reserve. They must ensure that units have mastered the mobilization process and are prepared for movement to MS, yet their focus is on daily operations and mission training. They have, in many instances, neglected JCS mobilization exercises, participating with response cells only. Many of these cells consist of primarily Individual Ready Reservists (IRRs) and other short tour personnel. Mobilization exercises which do not require command group and unit participation are totally inadequate because key personnel and units are not required to practice and become proficient at this complicated task. As a matter of fact, mobilization should be a task included on every unit METL. Can any unit be fully mission capable without mastering the mobilization process?

The next important step is the arrival at MS. It is at the MS that units must cross-level personnel, redistribute equipment and train toward it's CAPSTONE mission. The mission of the MS is to sustain or generate fully mission capable units as rapidly as possible. The MS must validate every unit mission capable with the exception of general officer commands. "General officer commands, except corps headquarters and co-located divisions that will be validated by the corps, will be validated as determined by the respective CONUSA."⁵

WHAT IS VALIDATION?

Validation is a command function. It is a process that is ongoing during the pre-mobilization phase and which evaluates all deploying Active and Reserve Component units in the areas of personnel, logistics and training. Its' purpose is to give deploying units a last minute check to determine the units capability to perform its' assigned wartime (capstone) mission when it is scheduled to deploy and to insure that a unit not meeting the minimum deployable criteria is not deployed without the approval of the supported CINC.⁶

It is important to remember that in many cases validation is a judgement call based on the procedures developed by each MS prior to mobilization. It is for this reason validation is a pejorative term for many Reserve Component commanders, to include Adjutants General and ARCOM commanders. Many commanders are convinced this is the process by which the Active Components will strip RC units of their personnel and equipment in order to fix the earlier deploying AC & RC units. These units entering the MS, that are mission capable early in the mobilization process could be rendered ineffective and non-mission capable through the redistribution of equipment and personnel. Historically this process has affected mobilized units, as was the case of the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB) which was mobilized during the Vietnam conflict. The "units had successfully completed operational readiness tests and were rated combat ready."⁷ After they had been rated combat ready individual fillers were taken from them and replacements were reassigned.

Losses included all battalion commanders and most of the company commanders and key brigade and battalion staff officers. Overall, in that period personnel changes involved some 40% of the total strength. The magnitude of these changes resulted in reduced readiness status for the brigade."⁸

An analysis of the missions of the 51 designated mobilization stations (which includes nine State-Operated Mobilization Stations (SOMS)) make it obvious that these are the hub of the mobilization process; however, these MSs will quickly become overcrowded upon mobilization and concern exists regarding the vulnerability of forces being mobilized at a few densely populated locations. As a matter of fact, a 1986 Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection of the Mobilization Process found the mobilization stations as currently resourced incapable of fully supporting mobilization. With the approved base closures and other base closures imminent this problem can only become exacerbated.

Additionally, most MSs have missions to deploy active forces, support Seaports and Airports of Embarkation (SPOE) and (APOE), assume command and control of mobilizing units upon arrival at MS, and to perform missions for other Major Army Commands (MACOMs). There are several solutions to the problems of mobilization stationing of RC units; however, Forces Command must reevaluate the stationing criteria, for units which states:

Station Active and mobilized RC forces to attain the most efficient utilization of installation resources, structure and capabilities.

Consider total post population, to include TOE and TDA units, tenant activities, patients, transients, prisoners, trainees, students, family members and civilians.

Station RC units with their command and control element where possible to facilitate training, planning and preparation for deployment.

Station units scheduled for deployment in the first 30 days at active installations (exception only when operational requirements dictate)."

By using these criteria, it is clear that in order to solve the overcrowded conditions described above, the Army must consider the expanded use of modified deployment (units shipping equipment for HS to SPOE and then moving unit personnel to MS); direct deployment (units deploying direct from HS to APOE without processing through a MS); and Mobilization Sites (designated locations where units mobilize for further processing and training but not necessarily a military installation with a stand-alone capability) as alternatives to facilitate the mobilization and deployment process.

SUMMARY

The mobilization process is a complex yet vital task for the Reserve Components. Only by emphasizing the need for training and improvement will the RC become proficient at this task. More importantly, this training will require those headquarters responsible for mobilizing the RC to validate their mobilization plans and make changes, when required.

ENDNOTES

1. Bennie J. Wilson III and James L. Gould, Mobilizing Guard and Reserve Forces, in The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Ed by Bennie J. Wilson, III, May 85. p. 186.

2. U.S. Department of the Army, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), Volume I, System Description, p. 3-1 & 3-2.

3. Ibid.

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5. U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), Vol. III, Part 1, p. C-2-3.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. p.4.

8. Ibid. p.49.

9. FORSCOM - HQDA, Commanders Joint Command Readiness Program, Mobilization and Deployment Situation Manual, October 1989, p. 37

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the integration of the Reserve Component into the active force to be accomplished in a timely manner a number of factors must be addressed. First, Regular Army planners must resist the temptation to break up Reserve Component units for use as fillers...second, it must be recognized that in the Reserve Components, unit cohesion does exist...third, while the implementation of plans and policies to accomplish integration remains a key challenge for both Regular Army and Reserve Component leadership, Regular Army officers have an additional responsibility for understanding the unique capabilities and limitations of the Reserve Components.¹

CONCLUSIONS

In this time of political and economic change the Reserve Forces have become an even more important part of the Total Force. In order to keep pace, it is obvious that our entire mobilization process must be modernized to ensure Reserve Forces are available to augment our nation's armed forces.

The first topic that must be considered is just how big is the role of the reserves and what is the proper mix of active and reserve forces. Acceptable formulas must be developed for drawing conclusions concerning the proper mix, since ".....costs have generally been a dominant factor in force-mix issues, leaving implicit the assumption that reserve units are close substitutes for similarly configured active units."² In short, we must

determine the role of the reserves based solely on their ability to perform those missions assigned to them, not on politics and budget constraints. If the RC is expected to perform the missions to the same standards as their AC counterparts, then they must be resourced accordingly and additional training time will be required.

Secondly, the National Command Authorities (NCA) must be aware of the reliance placed on the RC and be prepared to make the political decisions required to mobilize in case of a national emergency. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the Vietnam era when President Johnson refused to mobilize the RC despite recommendations by Secretary of Defense McNamara and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler. In fact General Wheeler stated:

We felt that it would be desirable to have a reserve call-up in order to make sure that the people of the US knew that we were in a war and not engaged at some two-penny military adventure. Because we didn't think it was going to prove to be a two-penny military adventure by any manner or means.

We cannot afford to adopt a military strategy based on mobilization of RC and then refuse to mobilize based on decisions influenced by domestic politics. However, if we are to rely on the RC then there are numerous changes which must be made to the mobilization process.

First, assumptions and planning parameters have changed. Since "Nifty Nugget" we have assumed that mobilization day (M-day), beginning of hostilities (C-day), and deployment day (D-day),

would all occur simultaneously. This assumption places a tremendous strain on the mobilization system to immediately begin deployment while at the same time mobilizing and processing RC units. With the changes that have and are occurring in Eastern Europe these assumptions are no longer valid. We must now revise our planning guidance based on the assumption that more warning time will be available prior to the beginning of hostilities. This will allow a more phased approach to mobilization and development of a sequential mobilization process and a set of procedures and systems to support it. We must take maximum advantage of this added warning time.

Next we should examine the procedures and systems to support the various levels of mobilization. The rules and systems which support the 200K, Partial Mobilization, and Full Mobilization are different. For example, the Mobilization Cross-Leveling (MCL) system is not activated for the 200K Call-Up, therefore, it is impossible to track personnel who are cross-leveled into and out of the unit. We must keep in mind that this unit is mobilized for a period of 90 days and may be released after that period, therefore, how do you release those RC personnel who were put into the AC unit or those AC personnel who were put into the RC unit. The 200K must be officially recognized as a level of mobilization and guidance for the execution of all levels of mobilization standardized and published. This approach would allow all levels of command to develop sequential plans based on the 200K Call-Up, followed by Partial and Full Mobilization, utilizing standard

guidance and systems.

There appears to be very few problems with the command and control of mobilized units. The relationships seem to be understood at all levels; however, some commands such as the CONUSAs and STARCs are not being utilized to their fullest potential. After the initial surge these headquarters seem to be looking for something to do because they are essentially force trackers. Both should be given additional requirements to support mobilized RC units and to assist with operational readiness. We must take full advantage of every asset available.

The philosophy of mobilization requires bringing RC units to a mobilization station (MS) and processing them on to active duty. The two exceptions being direct and modified deployers. This philosophy creates excessive loads at most MSs and concerns about the vulnerability of forces being mobilized at a few densely populated locations. It is a given that we must inprocess, provide the opportunity to train, and ensure operational readiness; however, a critical examination of the requirement to move all RC units to a MS must be taken. The focus must be on cutting down on congestion, reducing vulnerability, providing an opportunity to train, and providing the best support possible. There are many alternatives including the increased use of direct and modified deployers, utilization of existing RC training areas, and delaying units at home stations (HS). Of these alternatives direct and modified deployment seems to be the optimum solution, however, due to transportation, location, and readiness constraints not all

units can be supported in this category. Delaying units at HS is another alternative which appears to have some merit, however, close evaluation reveals that units for the most part can do little in the way of unit training at HS and support by the MS will be almost non-existent. The optimum solution is the use of existing RC training sites. This is a pejorative subject among many because it is felt that the RCs are using this as a way of obtaining money to build ranges and facilities during pre-mobilization. Additionally, many MS feel it is impossible to support this concept since much of the required support must come for the MS. The real solution lies in the use of these training sites without declaring them mobilization sites. Later deploying RC units can be mobilized at these sites, supported by the STARC and MS, train for a given period of time on equipment located at the site, and report to MS after the earlier deploying units have vacated the MS. This would allow the unit to train as a unit with its equipment during the early days of mobilization. Inprocessing at the MS could be accomplished by the advance party. Individual training and Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) could be accomplished after the units arrival at MS.

A perfect example of this type of training site is Camp Gruber, Ok., which has approximately 33,000 acres of training area with approximately 30,000 additional acres available through agreements with the Oklahoma Department of Wildlife Conservation and the Federal Government. Additionally, with construction which has been approved, funded, and let for bids the site will billet

2,000 personnel. All ranges and training courses are state of the art facilities and provide excellent training opportunities. Currently the following ranges/training courses exist at Camp Gruber:

1. MG, M2, M60 Transition Range and 10M ME Zero Range
2. Combat Pistol Range
3. 25m Zero/10M Transition Range
4. Record Fire Rifle Range
5. Light Anti-Armor Weapon Range
6. Hand Grenade Course (live fire)
7. Field Artillery/Mortar Scaled Range
8. Demolition/Landmine Area
9. Mini Tank Range
10. MOUT Assault Course
11. Mortar Sabot Range
12. Nap of the Earth (NOE) Aviation Courses
13. Three (3) land Navigation Courses
14. NBC Proficiency Course (gas chamber)
15. Vehicle Recovery Course
16. Numerous Engineer Construction Projects
17. Field Landing Strip (C-130)
18. Air Assault Training Facility

With all of these ranges and training areas available, most Oklahoma Army National Guard units mobilize at Camp Chaffee, AR, where there are overcrowded conditions and the competition for resources extremely high. Granted there are problems to be solved

concerning the support of these sites whether we call them Mobilization sites or whether we mobilize units there early and then relocate them to MSs. We must take a serious look at the numerous sites such as Camp Gruber which are located across the United States. This will solve many of the problems identified by the Department of the Army Inspector General mentioned earlier, in Chapter III.

SUMMARY

Mobilization is an extremely complex process which is made more difficult by the fact that any future mobilization may occur very rapidly. For this reason we must continue the process of centralized planning and decentralized execution of detailed, accurate, and well rehearsed mobilization plans. Planning for mobilization is a continuous process and should be conducted and/or integrated into other activities (i.e., JCS exercises, Overseas Deployment Training, and all exercises requiring Reserve Component participation) throughout the training year. The present mobilization system, which resulted from the experiences of mobilization exercises beginning with "MOBEX 76" (NIFTY NUGGET) and later mobilization exercises, has served us well throughout the 70's and 80's, but the world has changed. Military missions, force structure, and assets to satisfy them have evolved and the mobilization process must evolve as well. At some point in the future, the US Army may be called upon to go to war. The Army must

be prepared to win that war.

Mobilization is bringing the total Army to a state of readiness for war or for other national emergencies. Mobilization considerations are an inseparable part of peacetime (premobilization) training.⁴

The bottom line is we must plan better for mobilization. If our forces are cut and bases are closed we must possess the capability to regenerate our military power to meet any challenge in a very short period of time.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas Grodecki, MAJ, USA, Powder River to Soyang. The Cowboy Cannoneers, p. 24-25.

2. Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, p. 31.

3. Quoted in Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 126.

4. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 25-5, p. 1.

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18. Wilson, Bennie J. III. and Gould, James L. Mobilizing Guard and Reserve Forces. in The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force. May 85. p. 186.

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